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Abstract
Using a new dataset of 198 national elections across 48 democracies, this paper is
the first to systematically examine the effects of oil price shocks on incumbents’
political fortunes in developed oil-importing countries. We find that oil price
increases systematically lower the odds of reelection for incumbents and increase
the likelihood of changes in the ideology of the incoming government. These
shocks are found to operate through lowering consumption growth.
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The increase in gasoline prices stemming from the oil crisis overshadowed the
United States presidential debate of October 1980. Ronald Reagan and then-President
Jimmy Carter were going head to head in the election. Carter’s loss that year coin-
cided with a peak in oil prices. Other modern US presidential incumbents – for
example, Presidents Ford and George H.W. Bush - also lost their reelection bids fol-
lowing oil price spikes. This anecdotal evidence points to a broader question about
the role of exogenous shocks in determining electoral outcomes.
Our paper is the first effort to systematically examine the effect of oil price shocks
on the reelection probability of political incumbents in oil-importing countries. This
is the paper’s first contribution. We use a novel dataset of 198 national elections in
48 mostly oil-importing democracies, which also includes polling data in the run-up
to elections. The polling data allow us to explore the effect of exogenous shocks not
only on the election outcome, but also on voting intentions in the months leading
up to the vote. Depending on the political system, the dataset includes elections of
the chief executive in parliamentary or presidential systems. As large oil imports
leave a country vulnerable to changes in international crude oil prices, we rely on
these prices as an exogenous source of country-specific variation in terms of trade.
Specifically, we create a measure of ’oil price shock’ by interacting the fluctuations in
international oil prices (over which individual countries do not have explicit control)
with the country-specific intensity of oil imports relative to GDP.
An oil price shock one year prior to an election is found to significantly reduce
the likelihood of reelection for the incumbent party. Specifically, a 1% increase in
our oil shock measure decreases the likelihood of incumbent re-election by over six
percentage points. Furthermore, novel polling data confirm that these shocks operate
by reducing the popularity of the sitting government. We show that both right-wing
and left-wing incumbent parties are susceptible to crude oil price increases. We verify
that the winning parties are more likely to belong to the opposite end of the political
spectrum. In other words, following an oil price increase, a left-leaning incumbent
party is more likely to be replaced by a right-leaning party and vice versa. The
results remain robust to a variety of checks and alternative specifications. When we
use changes in import commodity prices for 45 commodities instead of oil prices only,
we find that an increase in the import prices one year prior to elections is significantly
associated with a reduction in the odds of incumbent reelection. Our results also
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survive when we control for voter turnout, pre-determined elections, other macro
variables, and different lags for oil shocks.
Our paper investigates the mechanisms of the impact. This is its second contribu-
tion. First, we document that a country’s media chatter about gasoline price increase
picks up significantly in response to a positive oil price shocks, verifying that in-
creases in international oil prices translate to domestic population’s concerns and
anxiety about gasoline price increases, especially in countries more dependent on oil
imports. Second, since most countries in our sample are oil importers, an increase
in crude oil prices would reduce the purchasing power of the population (Hamil-
ton, 2003; Blanchard and Gali, 2009). Consistent with this logic, we discover that
an increase in oil prices is found to reduce consumption growth. This is a potential
mechanism which links oil price movements with voter behavior in elections. Inter-
estingly, oil shocks do not impact output growth significantly as one would typically
expect. Finally, media chatter about economic reforms rises in response to a positive
oil price shocks, suggesting demand for changes in the economic, and potentially
political, status quo.
This paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, it contributes di-
rectly to the debate between ideological versus economic factors of election outcomes.
A large public choice literature suggests voters vote for the candidate that gives them
the highest monetary return (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). Downs (1957) and Hinich
and Munger (1994) argue that in addition to self-interest, ideology, culture and moral
codes are also a part of voters’ decisions. Voters evaluate candidates according to
how close they are to the voter’s ideological ideal. Our findings suggest voters, on
the aggregate, seem to vote without a clear ideological pattern. Economic factors,
even exogenous, can sway their votes.
Second, our contributes to the literature on retrospective voting, which highlights
cases in which incumbent governments are punished for events out of their control1.
Many studies discuss the effects of natural disasters on local elections (see, for ex-
ample, Gasper and Reeves, 2011; Healy and Malhotra, 2010; Cole et al., 2012; Wang
and Berdiev, 2015; Achen and Bartels, 2017). A consistent finding from these studies
is that incumbents’ electoral fortunes suffer after natural disasters. The finding is
intuitive as the impacts of natural disasters are generally dramatic and concentrated
at the local level. In contrast, we show that relatively more subtle events, such as oil
1See Healy and Malhotra (2013) for a review of the retrospective voting literature.
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price fluctuations, can also be powerful factors influencing political outcomes.
Finally, our paper is related to a rich literature on the political effects of com-
modity booms and busts in commodity exporters that operate via commodity price
windfalls2. These studies can roughly be divided into those studying the effects of
commodity price shocks on conflict versus those on elections or democratic transi-
tions. The formers find a nuanced relationship between resource wealth and conflict,
depending on the region, time period, and precise commodities considered3. The
studies of commodity price shocks on election and democratic transitions also pro-
vide mixed conclusions4. Wolfers (2007) find that voters in US oil-producing states
tend to re-elect incumbent governors when oil prices rise and vote them out when
oil prices drop. Our paper is related but distinct from this literature. It examines the
impact of oil price shocks on incumbent’s political fortune in a set of predominantly
developed oil-importing countries, as opposed to oil- or commodity-exporting states
or countries. The impact is found to operate via changes in consumption growth.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the data. Section
3 shows the main results. Section 4 presents several robustness checks. Section 5
concludes.
2 Data
Our analysis draws on two main datasets. The first covers election polls and
outcomes for 198 elections across 48 countries worldwide over the period 1980-2020.
Only elections with available polling data are included. On average, each country
has four elections. There are 146 parliamentary and 52 presidential elections. The
list of countries and the number of elections in each country by year are presented in
Figure A1 and Table A1. The polling data originate from multiple polling agencies
for each country. Official election results are available from multiple sources. For
each election, voting intentions by political party (i.e. polls) are gathered, alongside
election outcomes5. It is important to consider the incumbent changes at the political
party level rather than for individual politicians, since term limits could create me-
2See van der Ploeg (2011) for a excellent survey.
3See Bruckner and Ciccone (2010), Bazzi and Blattman (2014), Dube and Vargas (2013).
4See Bruckner et al. (2012), Caselli and Tesei (2016), Andersen and Aslaksen (2013), Burke and
Leigh (2010).
5In some polls, respondents are allowed to answer election questions with “Don’t Know” or “Not
Sure”. This will mechanically make voting intentions incompatible with the final election outcomes.
In such cases, we drop the extraneous responses, and rescale the polls, considering only respondents
who have selected a political party.
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chanical turnover of individuals. Countries for which polling data are unavailable are
not included in our dataset. In total, the dataset has over 12,009 polling observations,
which are aggregated into 2,097 election-month polling observations for the incum-
bent party. Hence, on average, each election has about 11 election-month polling
observations.
In addition to voter intentions, we include data on several additional election
characteristics. First, an indicator variable is created to denote elections where the
incumbent party remains in power following the election. This variable is at the party-
level, and therefore term limits will not affect the outcome. For example, consider the
1988 US Presidential Election. George H.W. Bush was elected president, after Ronald
Reagan served two terms. Since the Republican party remained in power, we treat
that episode as the incumbent staying in power.
In cases of political coalitions, where multiple parties form the government, our
measure of incumbency considers the political party of the chief executive. Second,
we use data on the name of the political party incumbent, and the political party
which wins the election. With that data, the political orientation of the incumbents
and election winners are calculated based on party ideological orientation.
For the majority of elections and parties, data on left-right orientation are taken
from the ParlGov Party Database (Döring and Manow, 2019). This database contains
information for over 1,600 political parties in 37 democracies in the EU and OECD.
For each party, a time-invariant score between 0 and 10 is provided, classifying their
political position from left-wing to right-wing, respectively. This score, in turn, is
based on data from Castles and Mair (1984), Huber and Inglehart (1995), Benoit and
Laver (2006), and Bakker et al. (2015). For example, the UK Conservative Party has
a score of 7.4, while the French Socialist Party has a score of 3.2. In our analysis,
we do not use the continuous index, but rather split parties into left-wing and right-
wing using the threshold value of 5. Overall, this dataset provides information for
most countries in our sample. For countries outside the ParlGov sample (primarily
South America), we also classify incumbents and election winners as left-wing or
right-wing using various online sources. For example, Jair Bolsonaro, the winner
of the 2018 Brazilian general election is classified as right-wing, based on his then-
party, Partido Social Liberal. In sum, of the 198 elections in our main sample, there
are 89 left-wing incumbents and 109 right-wing incumbents. Separately, there are 81
left-wing election winners, and 117 right-wing election winners.
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Finally, voter turnout data are collected, as well as an indicator for whether voting
is compulsory for a given election. Most of the data are from the IDEA Voter Turnout
Database; any gaps are supplemented using online sources.
The main source of shock is based on changes in international oil prices, weighted
by the average country-specific oil import values. International oil prices are obtained
from the World Bank “Pink Sheet” data. These data contain real and nominal crude
oil prices; for our main analysis, we use real oil prices. Data on the value of oil
imports and GDP in US dollars are obtained from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook.
The country-year weights are constructed by taking three-year rolling averages of oil
imports to GDP. Combining these weights with oil prices, our main index for country
i and year t is constructed as:
∆ ln(Crude Oil Index)i,t = ∆[ln(Crude Oil Price)t × Ωi,Oil,t]






















The countries in our sample differ considerably in the amount of oil imported, and
these weights capture the ’exposure’ to fluctuations in international oil prices. For
example, oil imports by Belgium and The Netherlands were around 10% of GDP, on
average, across election years. In Colombia, however, this value was only 0.9% of
GDP. Our main hypothesis is that price increases in countries which import more
oil should have a stronger (negative) impact on electoral outcomes of incumbents.6
Although the main results in this paper are based on oil shocks constructed with real
oil prices and three-year rolling average weights, all results are also robust to the use
of nominal prices, and five-year rolling weights.
The next data source is the Commodity Terms of Trade Database introduced in
Gruss and Kebhaj (2019). These data consist of country-specific commodity price
indices, based on a set of 45 individual commodities. The formula for the gross
6It should be noted that several countries in our sample, such as Colombia, export oil as well.
However, the effects of international oil prices for exporters should work in the opposite direction,
thereby attenuating out estimates toward zero. Therefore, we choose to keep these countries in the
sample for the main results.
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import price index is:





In the above specification, Pj,t refers to the logarithm of the real price of commodity
j in time period t. Ωi,j,t denote the commodity-country-specific weights by which
the prices are weighted. The country specific weights are based on the ratio of gross
imports to GDP. Rolling weights use a moving average of the last three time periods
before t to construct Ωi,j,t. The commodity price indices are available at both an
annual and monthly frequency over our sample period. We use the annual data for
our main specification and turn to monthly data when considering the polling data.
We show that our results are robust to using rolling as well as fixed weights.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the key variables. The average oil shock in
election years in real terms is -0.17%, and -0.15% in nominal terms. In approximately
half of the elections (49.5%), the incumbent party remains in power.
3 Main Results
Our baseline specification is as follows:
1(Incumbent Stays)c,y = αc + βy + µ∆ ln(Crude Oil Index)c,y−1 + εc,y (1)
where c is for country, y is for year. 1(Incumbent Stays)c,y takes the value of 1 if the
incumbent party wins the election. ∆ ln(Crude Oil Index)c,y−1 captures an oil price
shock one year ago. Country fixed effect, αc, capture time-invariant difference in
political systems and institutional quality. The specification also includes year fixed
effects, βy, which capture global shocks over time, such as the worldwide downturn
due to the Global Financial Crisis. Finally, the standard errors in our main tables are
clustered at the country level, to address the correlation of oil price shocks within
each country. In a robustness exercise, we show that the results are robust to multi-
way clustering across countries and years (Table A2).
We also examine the effect of changes in import commodity prices on election
outcomes:
1(Incumbent Stays)c,y = αc + βy + µ∆ ln(Import ComPI)c,y−1 + εc,y (2)
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where ∆ ln(Import ComPI)c,y−1 captures the lagged change in the import commodity
price index. Finally, using the polling data, we test the specification:
Voting Intention Incumbenti,m = αi + βm + µ∆ ln(Crude Oil Index)i,m−12 + εi,m (3)
where i denotes the election and m denotes the month. Voting Intention Incumbenti,m
captures the voting intentions for the incumbent party in a given month.
∆ ln(Crude Oil Index)i,m−12 captures the country-specific change in the crude oil price
index with a 12-month lag. Lastly, αi and βm are election and month fixed effects.
Table 2 presents our main results on the impacts of oil price shocks on electoral
turnover. Column 1 shows that an increase in crude oil prices in the previous year
systematically and negatively affects the reelection chance of the incumbent party. A
1% increase in crude oil index reduces the reelection chance by 6.6 percentage points.
This is equivalent to a 13% decrease in the likelihood of incumbent re-election from
the mean. To address the concern of potential term limits for individual politicians,
incumbency is defined at the party-level, as aforementioned. Hence, an incumbent
is considered winning the reelection even if another member of the party wins the
election.
Figure 1 shows the binned scatter plot of the result from column (1) of Table 2. The
figure groups observations into 30 equal-sized bins along the horizontal axis. Thus,
each point represents seven election results, on average. Overall, Figure 1 shows that
the relationship between oil price shocks and election turnover is negative, robust,
and not driven by outliers in our data.
As a concrete example, consider the 2011 parliamentary election in Croatia. In
that election, the incumbent Croatian Democratic Union (Prime Minister Jadranka
Kosor) faced the Social Democratic Party of Croatia (with leader Zoran Milanović).
In our data, the corresponding real oil shock is positive and above average, signifying
a price increase for Croatia (an oil importer). Indeed, this election resulted in a
significant loss for the incumbent party, and an absolute majority for the opposition.
Of course, we do not claim that the outcome was uniquely determined by the oil
price shock. However, we document that these exogenous shocks are an important
factor influencing voter behavior around elections.
In Column 2 of Table 2, we test whether the baseline result is driven by the po-
litical orientation of the incumbent. We define two types of political orientation: left
wing (LW) and right-wing (RW). It is noteworthy that the interaction terms between
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oil shock and the political orientation of incumbents are both statistically insignifi-
cant. This result implies that, irrespective of their political orientation, incumbents
are vulnerable to oil shocks.
Column 3 shows that the results are also robust when we control for changes in
copper prices, a proxy for global demand shocks (see Hamilton, 2015). In Column
4, we show that oil shocks still sway electoral outcomes even when other macro
variables at current year and one-year prior are controlled for, namely GDP growth,
inflation and unemployment rate.
When controlling for voter turnout and compulsory voting in elections, the base-
line results remain qualitatively and quantitatively similar (Column 5 of Table 2).
Importantly, this specification also controls for whether the election is a snap election
or predetermined. This test addresses the concern that the timing of an election could
be influenced by oil price movements.
The results are robust to dropping large countries that could arguably influence
oil prices (Column 6). In particularly, this specification drops all election from the US,
Germany, France, and the UK. The results remain essentially unchanged compared
to baseline. An additional concern may be that the results are driven by the mass of
elections over the past decade, and in particular following the Global Financial Crisis
(GFC). In Column 7, we drop all elections after 2007 and test our main specification
again. Even though this reduces our sample, the results remain robust and highly sig-
nificant. The main findings are not driven by excessive volatility in international oil
prices over the last decade. Nevertheless, we also find a significant negative relation-
ship between oil price shocks and incumbency in the years since the GFC (available
on request).
The main result is also robust and quantitatively similar to using the lagged
change of the import commodity index, consisting of 45 import commodity prices
(Column 8). A 1% increase in import commodity index in the previous year is asso-
ciated with about 12 percentage point increase in the likelihood that the incumbent
party will lose the election.
Finally, in Column 9 we show that a crude oil shock is not only more likely to cause
electoral turnover, but it may also cause a reversal in political leaning. In particular,
we use an indicator for different types of ideological transitions. A transition is
defined as any instance where the incumbent and election winners have a different
ideology (i.e. left-wing versus right-wing). The result in Column 9 shows that oil
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shocks are associated with a reversal in political orientation. A 1% increase in oil
price shock leads to a 6.7 percentage points increase in the likelihood that the winning
party belongs to the other end of the political spectrum. In other words, following
an oil price increase, a left-leaning incumbent party is more likely to be replaced by a
right-leaning party and vice versa. It is as if voters punish the incumbent party and
would like a wholesale change in political orientations.
Oil price shocks reduce consumption growth, suggesting one potential mechanism
through which oil shocks affect voting behavior. Columns (1)-(2) in Table 3 shows
the regression results using data on per capita final consumption by household and
non-profit institutions serving households. The results suggest that oil shocks in
the previous period have a significant negative effect on lagged private consumption
growth. This reduction could provide an explanation for why voters react so strongly
against incumbents in upcoming elections. Meanwhile, Columns (3)-(4) show that
there is no corresponding effect of oil shocks on lagged GDP growth, suggesting that
the main mechanism works through the consumption channel, not output.
Finally, we highlight the impact of oil price shocks on the domestic political land-
scape using two media-based measures. The first is an index of discussions on eco-
nomic reforms, taken from Arezki et al. (2020). For each country-year, this index
measures the percentage of news media that discusses economic reforms7. The sec-
ond is a measure of ’gas price’ discussions, which captures the proportion of media
coverage focused on gas price increases. Details on the construction of this index are
in Appendix B. Table 4 presents the results on the effects of our oil price shock mea-
sure on the two media indices. In doing so, we test two hypotheses: first, that oil
price increases are positively associated with gas price discussions. This is expected
to be the case if oil shocks truly capture changing domestic conditions. The second
hypothesis is that oil price shocks lead to increased discussions (and demands for)
economic reform. Since our main results highlight strong effects of oil shocks on
electoral outcomes, it is possible that a desire for change is a mechanism galvanizing
the electorate. Indeed, the results in Table 4 confirm both these hypotheses, both in
a broader sample covering 2000-2019 and when focusing exclusively on the election
years. The results in Column 1 suggest a 1% increase in our oil price shock measure
causes a 0.008 percentage point increase in gas price chatter, or a 13% increase from
the mean, suggesting that international oil price increases stir domestic population’s
7A newspaper article is defined as discussing economic reforms when it contains the keywords
[”economic” or ”economy”] AND [”reform” or ”reforms”]
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concerns and anxiety about gasoline price increases. The results in Column 2 suggest
a 1% increase the oil price shock measure causes 0.08 percentage point increase in
economic reform chatter, suggesting a demand for economic change. In addition,
Columns (3) and (4) suggest that the effects are even stronger quantitatively before
election years, suggesting a higher sensitivity to oil price shocks. Ultimately, these
results show that the oil price shocks affect the population’s economic concerns and
demand for economic reforms.
4 Robustness Checks
Our baseline results survive a number of additional robustness checks. First, a
key contribution of this dataset is polling data leading up to every election. In Table
A3 we test for the effects of oil shocks on the voting intention for the incumbent
party in the polls, as outlined in Equation 3. For example, Column (1) shows that
for each election, a 1% increase in the crude oil index 12 months ago reduces voter’s
intention to reelect incumbent party by 0.4 percentage points. The effect is not large in
magnitude, but in close elections, even small effects may be important on the margin.
Thus, the fluctuations in oil prices shift the political fortunes of the incumbent party
leading up to the vote, consistent with our main results.
Table A4 shows that when the contemporaneous effect and annual lags of oil
shocks are used, the one-year lag is the only one that causes significant electoral
turnover. Table A5 confirms this finding. It further suggests that when different
quarterly lags are used (up to right quarters before the elections), only oil shocks
four and five quarters before elections are statistically significantly correlated with
the change of power. This period may best coincide with the electoral cycle, though
further research is needed to ascertain this hypothesis. The magnitude is also much
larger than that of the annual lags. For example, a 1% increase in crude oil index a
year (four quarters) before an election reduces the reelection chance by 26 percentage
points.
In Table A6, we test for non-linear effects of oil shocks, as it is possible that larger
oil shocks could have disproportionately larger impacts on electoral outcomes. How-
ever, the quadratic term of oil shocks is not significant, suggesting an absence of
non-linear effects.
Finally, a potential concern for our analysis would be if the results are driven by
countries which import small amounts of crude oil. To address this, we consider
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the weights, Ωi,Oil,t, used to construct our oil price index. These weights capture the
moving average oil import value to GDP ratios in the three years leading up to each
election. Figure A2 presents a density plot of these values for our election sample.
The values range from 0.2% to 12.5%, with a median of 2.8%. In Table A7 we test
the robustness of our main results to dropping election with small oil import/GDP
values. Columns 2 and 3 show that dropping elections with values below the 5th and
10th percentile, respectively, do not affect our results. Even after dropping elections
below the 25th percentile (Column 4), the results remain significant, although the
magnitude is slightly lower. We interpret this as evidence that our results are not
spuriously driven by small oil importers.
5 Conclusion
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to analyze the effect of oil price shocks on
electoral outcomes in a sample of oil-importing countries. The results show that an
oil price increase systematically lowers the odds of reelection for incumbents while
increasing the likelihood of an ideology reversal. These shocks are associated with
worsening polling performance for incumbents in the run-up to elections. We provide
evidence that oil price increases lead to lower consumption growth, and suggest that
this may be the mechanism through which these shocks affect voter behavior.
The systematic nature of the bias against the incumbent irrespective of political
leaning suggests a rejection of the often-argued voting patterns on the basis of ide-
ology. Our results are consistent with the research on voter retrospection, and con-
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Figure 1: Partial Correlation Scatterplot
Notes: Binned scatterplot with 30 equal-sized bins. The full sample contains 198 elections. Year and Country fixed effects are
residualized to produce the figure.
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7 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Main Variables
Variable Count Mean Standard 25 Pctile 50 Pctile 75 Pctile
Deviation
.
Real Oil Shock 190 -.0017117 .0257387 -.015572 .0012883 .010391
Nominal Oil Shock 190 -.0014966 .0267038 -.0146259 .0015328 .0123906
∆ ln(Import ComPI)t−1 193 -.0009558 .0149154 -.0053587 .0008206 .0077343
Indicator: Incumbent Stays 198 .4949495 .5012419 0 0 1
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Table 2: Changes in Crude Oil Prices and Electoral Turnover
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent variable: =1 Incumbent Stays =1 Ideology
Transition
Oil Shock Specification: 3-Year MA 3-Year MA
Real Oil Shockt−1 -6.601∗∗∗ -9.471∗∗∗ -3.679∗∗∗ -5.412∗∗ -6.554∗∗∗ -6.836∗∗ -26.381∗∗ 6.747∗∗∗
(2.340) (2.886) (1.208) (2.663) (2.315) (2.773) (9.637) (2.258)
∆ ln(Import ComPI)t−1 -12.160∗∗
(5.703)
=1 LW Incumbent -0.073
(0.059)
Real Oil Shockt−1 X LW Incumbent 5.923
(3.582)
















=1 Compulsory Voting Election 0.174
(0.382)
=1 Snap Election -0.043
(0.093)
Year FE X X X X X X X X
Country FE X X X X X X X X X
R2 0.439 0.459 0.344 0.486 0.443 0.463 0.692 0.429 0.435
Mean Dependent Variable 0.494 0.494 0.500 0.497 0.494 0.470 0.552 0.492 0.386
Number of Elections 176 176 186 173 176 151 29 181 176
Number of Countries 45 45 45 44 45 41 10 45 45
Notes: In all columns, oil import exposure is the 3-year rolling average, from t-3 to t-1, of oil imports as a share of GDP. Standard errors are clustered at the country
level and reported in parentheses, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 3: Oil Price Shocks, Consumption Growth, GDP Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: ∆ ln(Final Consumption)t−1 GDP Growth(% Change)t−1
Oil Shock Specification: 3-Year MA 3-Year MA
Real Oil Shockt−1 -0.352∗ 1.530
(0.178) (15.237)
Real Oil Shockt−2 0.395∗ -6.122
(0.212) (19.523)
Real Oil Shockt−3 -0.107 -3.204
(0.232) (17.927)
Nominal Oil Shockt−1 -0.315∗ 5.470
(0.160) (15.023)
Nominal Oil Shockt−2 0.375∗ -8.142
(0.197) (19.102)
Nominal Oil Shockt−3 -0.123 -4.956
(0.216) (17.623)
Year FE X X X X
Country FE X X X X
R2 0.526 0.525 0.585 0.586
Mean Dependent Variable 0.017 0.017 2.669 2.669
Number of Elections 172 172 175 175
Number of Countries 44 44 45 45
Notes: The dependent variable in Columns (1)-(2) is log change in Households and NPISHs Final con-
sumption expenditure per capita (constant 2010 USD). In all columns, oil import exposure is the 3-year
rolling average, from t-3 to t-1, of oil imports as a share of GDP. Standard errors are clustered at the country
level and reported in parentheses, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 4: Oil Price Shocks and Media Chatter
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Gas Price Reform Gas Price Reform
Chattert Chattert Chattert−1 Chattert−1
Sample: Full Sample Election Years
Real Oil Shockt 0.858∗∗ 8.029∗∗∗
(0.353) (2.475)
Real Oil Shockt−1 1.759∗∗ 17.260∗∗∗
(0.679) (4.832)
Year FE X X X X
Country FE X X X X
R2 0.408 0.493 0.627 0.722
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.060 1.014 0.050 0.869
Number of Observations 943 893 166 168
Number of Countries 49 48 45 45
Notes: The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (3) is a normalized measure of media
discussions about gas price increases. The dependent variable in Columns (2) and (4) is a
normalized measure of media discussions of economic reforms, based on Arezki et al. (2020).
Both measures relate to articles in English over the 2000-2019 period. The measure of real oil
shocks is based on fluctuations in international oil prices and a country-specific measure of
oil imports relative to GDP. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in
parentheses, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Our analysis draws on two main datasets. The first covers election polls and
outcomes for 198 elections across 48 countries worldwide over the period 1980-2020.
On average, each country has four election cycles. There are 146 parliamentary and
52 presidential elections. The list of countries and the number of elections in each
country by year are presented in the Table A1 and Figure A1.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the key variables. For an average election,
the average oil shock in real terms is -0.17%, and -0.15% in nominal terms. In 49.5%
of the elections, the incumbent party wins the election.
Our baseline results survive a battery of other robustness checks. First, the polling
data analyses yield similar results (Table A3). For example, Column (1) shows that for
each election, a 1% increase in the crude oil index 12 months ago reduces a voter’s in-
tention to reelect the incumbent party by 0.4 percentage points. Thus, the fluctuations
in oil prices shift the political fortunes of the incumbent party.
Table A6 tests for non-linear effects of oil shocks, as it is possible that larger oil
shocks could have disproportionately larger impacts on electoral outcomes. However,
the quadratic term of oil shocks is not significant, suggesting an absence of non-linear
effects.
1
Figure A1: Number of Elections by Year
Notes: This figure presents the number of elections in year of the sample.
Figure A2: Distribution of Oil Import/GDP Ratios
Notes: This figure presents a kernel density plot of the three-year moving average oil import to GDP ratios for our sample of
election years. These values are used in the construction of our oil price index.
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A Tables
Table A1: Election and Polling Data by Country



















































Table A2: Oil Price Shocks and Alternative Standard Error Clustering
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: =1 Incumbent Stays
Oil Shock Specification: 3-Year MA 5-Year MA
Real Oil Shockt−1 -6.601∗∗∗ -8.697∗∗
(2.219) (3.082)
Nominal Oil Shockt−1 -6.140∗∗∗ -7.940∗∗
(2.106) (2.986)
Country FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
R2 0.439 0.438 0.431 0.429
Mean Dependent Variable 0.494 0.494 0.497 0.497
Number of Elections 176 176 175 175
Number of Countries 45 45 45 45
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the country and year level and reported in
parentheses, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table A3: Oil Price Shocks and Polling Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Voting Intention for Incumbent
Oil Shock Specification: 3-Year MA 5-Year MA
Oil Shockt−12 -43.248∗∗ -15.925 -62.094∗ -32.679∗∗
(21.601) (9.875) (35.340) (15.546)
Month FE X X X X
Country FE X X
Election FE X X
R2 0.701 0.934 0.702 0.933
Mean Dependent Variable 33.714 33.714 33.647 33.647
Observations 2,221 2,221 2,199 2,199
Number of Elections 179 179 177 177
Notes: Voting intention captures the percentage of voters intending to vote for the
incumbent party. In columns (1) and (2), oil import exposure is the 3-year rolling
average, from t-3 to t-1, of oil imports as a share of GDP. In columns (3) and (4), oil
import exposure is the 5-year rolling average, from t-5 to t-1, of oil imports as a share
of GDP. The poll sample includes the actual elections as well. Standard errors are
clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses, stars indicate *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A4: Oil Price Shocks with Annual Lags
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: =1 Incumbent Stays
Oil Shock Specification: Real Shock
Oil Shockt -2.710 0.490 0.431 -2.549
(2.002) (2.391) (2.529) (3.476)
Oil Shockt−1 -6.866∗∗ -6.714∗ -6.662∗
(2.677) (3.510) (3.398)




Country FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
R2 0.413 0.440 0.440 0.451
Mean Dependent Variable 0.494 0.494 0.494 0.497
Number of Elections 176 176 176 175
Number of Countries 45 45 45 45
Notes: Oil shocks calculated using international crude oil prices weighted by
3-year rolling windows of oil import to GDP value for each country. Annual
lags are included. For example, Oil Shockt−1 is the Crude Oil Shock one year
before the election. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and re-
ported in parentheses, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A5: Oil Price Shocks with Quarterly Lags
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: =1 Incumbent Stays
Oil Shock Specification: 3-Year MA 5-Year MA
Oil Shockt -0.076 -3.689
(7.868) (7.683)
Oil Shockt−1 -0.363 -1.537
(7.436) (12.977)
Oil Shockt−2 14.077 11.928
(8.451) (8.307)
Oil Shockt−3 -3.118 -1.777
(4.937) (8.478)
Oil Shockt−4 -26.788∗∗∗ -19.942∗∗
(8.949) (9.145)
Oil Shockt−5 -11.004∗∗∗ -2.014
(4.030) (7.609)
Oil Shockt−6 -3.108 7.257
(3.622) (5.349)
Oil Shockt−7 3.129 1.838
(6.407) (6.890)
Oil Shockt−8 4.047 5.388
(4.663) (7.150)
Country FE X X
Quarter FE X X
R2 0.730 0.697
Mean Dependent Variable 0.510 0.503
Observations 151 149
Number of Elections 43 43
Notes: Oil shocks calculated using international crude oil prices
weighted by 3-year rolling windows of oil import to GDP value
for each country. Quarterly lags are included. For example,
Oil Shockt−1 is Crude Oil Shocks one quarter before the election.
Standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in
parentheses, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A6: Non-Linear Effects of Oil Price Shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: =1 Incumbent Stays
Oil Shock Specification: 3-Year MA 5-Year MA
Real Oil Shockt−1 -5.522∗∗ -8.440∗∗
(2.546) (3.973)
Real Oil Shock2t−1 52.444 95.107(31.826) (129.298)
Nominal Oil Shockt−1 -5.147∗∗ -7.828∗
(2.506) (4.070)
Nominal Oil Shock2t−1 46.199 110.104(27.699) (112.249)
Year FE X X X X
Country FE X X X X
R2 0.446 0.444 0.433 0.433
Mean Dependent Variable 0.494 0.494 0.497 0.497
Number of Elections 176 176 175 175
Number of Countries 45 45 45 45
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses,
stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table A7: Changes in Crude Oil Prices and Electoral Turnover - Dropping
Small Oil Import/GDP Values
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: =1 Incumbent Stays
Oil Shock Specification: 3-Year MA
Oil Import/GDP Value: Full Sample >5th Pct >10th pct >25th pct
Real Oil Shockt−1 -6.601∗∗∗ -6.790∗∗∗ -6.166∗∗ -4.709∗
(2.340) (2.323) (2.395) (2.746)
Country FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
R2 0.439 0.450 0.458 0.448
Mean Dependent Variable 0.494 0.497 0.494 0.489
Number of Elections 176 169 160 135
Number of Countries 45 45 43 40
Notes: The table presents the results from changes in crude oil price on incumbent re-election
by progressively dropping elections with very small oil import/GDP values. These values are
based on three-year moving averages leading up to the election year. Column 1 presents our
baseline estimates. Columns 2-4 present the results with oil import/GDP values above the
5th, 10th, and 25th percentiles, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the country level
and reported in parentheses, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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B Gas Price Chatter Index
Table A8: Gas Price Chatter Keywords










The gas price chatter index is constructed using a keyword search of newspaper
media using the Factiva database. For each country in our sample and each year in
the period 2000-2019, we count the number of articles containing at least one term
from each of the three categories in Table A8, and these terms appear in close prox-
imity to each other. In this manner, we aim to capture articles specifically discussing
gas price increases. Then, these counts are normalized by the total number of articles
in each country-year, in order to account for changing newspaper coverage in Factiva.
The final index is constructed as:
GasPriceChatteri,t = 100 ×
GasPriceArticlesi,t
TotalArticlesi,t
Figure A3 presents the relationship between the oil price index and the gas price
chatter measure for the United States, over the period 2000-2019. The 2000s were char-
acterized by relatively high discussions of gas prices, which peaked in 2008. These we
accompanied by high, positive values of our oil price shock measure, corresponding
to increases in oil prices. In contrast, over the past ten years, both measures have
declined significantly. The lower reliance of the US on oil imports over this period is
likely a part of this secular trend.
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Figure A3: Oil Price Shock and Gas Price Chatter, United States
Notes: This figure presents oil price shocks (LHS) and gas price chatter (RHS) for the United States for the period 2000-2019.
9
